



# Convención sobre la conservación de las especies migratorias de animales silvestres

Secretaría administrada por el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente



## 32ª reunión del Comité Permanente

Bonn, 8-9 de noviembre de 2007

CMS/StC32/18/Rev.1  
Punto 9.g del orden del día

### GRUPO ESPECIAL PARA LA GRIPE AVIAR (Res. 8.27)

#### Introducción

1. En agosto de 2005, las preocupaciones sobre el papel de las aves migratorias como vectores posibles del virus del subtipo H5N1 de la gripe aviar altamente patógena (HPAI) llevaron a la Secretaría CMS, en estrecha colaboración con la Secretaría AEWA, a establecer un Grupo especial sobre la gripe aviar y las aves silvestres (TF).

2. El TF se estableció con el propósito de asegurar que los esfuerzos a escala internacional para contener HPAI no descuidasen información fundamental relativa a las especies migratorias ni tampoco otras consideraciones ambientales. El TF se compone al presente de 14 miembros y observadores, que abarcan organismos de la ONU, tratados sobre la fauna silvestre y organizaciones especializadas intergubernamentales y no gubernamentales. La CMS, AEWA, BirdLife International, la Convención sobre la Diversidad Biológica, el International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC/FACE), la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO), la International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Ramsar, Wetlands International, la Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) y la Zoological Society of London (ZSL) son miembros a parte plena, mientras que el PNUMA, la Organización Mundial de la Salud y la Organización Mundial para la Salud Animal (OIE) participan en tanto que observadores.

3. Desde sus comienzos, el TF se ha esforzado en obtener la mejor asesoría científica relativa al impacto sobre la conservación de la propagación del H5N1, evaluando el papel de las aves migratorias como vectores del virus, y asesorando sobre las causas iniciales de la epidemia, así como sobre las medidas técnicamente idóneas para combatirla y desarrollar conocimientos de alerta avanzada. La información y las declaraciones se difundieron abundantemente bajo forma de comunicados de prensa, para concientizar a la comunidad internacional sobre los efectos de HPAI sobre la fauna silvestre, asesorar sobre las opciones en materia de políticas a seguir, y contrarrestar, cuando hacía falta, las declaraciones periodísticas sin fundamento sobre el papel de las especies migratorias en la propagación del virus.

#### Acontecimientos desde la trigésimo primera reunión del Comité Permanente en septiembre de 2006

4. Desde la COP8, el número de los miembros y observadores del TF ha crecido hasta alcanzar la cifra presente de 14 en total. El TF funciona principalmente mediante correspondencia electrónica y se reúne periódicamente por teleconferencia. Se han celebrado siete teleconferencias

*Para economizar recursos, sólo se ha impreso un número limitado de ejemplares del presente documento.  
Se ruega a los delegados que lleven sus propios ejemplares a las reuniones y eviten solicitar otros*

desde la COP8 y nueve en total. La última teleconferencia del TF se celebró el 31 de julio de 2007 y debatió los temas siguientes:

- Resultados del taller de Aviemore
- Declaración del Grupo especial
- Folleto 'Gripe aviar y aves silvestres'
- Coordinación conjunta del TF por la CMS y la FAO
- Miembros del TF
- Tratamiento del AI en reuniones futuras
- AIWEb (Gripe aviar, sitio en la red sobre la fauna silvestre y el medio ambiente)

### **Taller sobre la gripe aviar y la fauna silvestre en relación con las 'lecciones aprendidas de índole práctica', Aviemore, Escocia, 26 a 28 de junio de 2007**

5. Amén de su labor habitual, el TF desempeñó un papel central en la organización del taller sobre la gripe aviar y la fauna silvestre en relación con las 'lecciones aprendidas de índole práctica' vinculadas a los brotes de gripe aviar altamente patogénica (HPAI) en las aves silvestres, llevado a cabo por PNUMA/CMS y Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) en Aviemore, Escocia, del 26 al 28 de junio de 2007. Se trató de la segunda reunión técnica de la serie, tras el exitoso seminario en Nairobi sobre la gripe aviar y el medio ambiente de abril de 2006. La reunión fue cofinanciada por SNH, FAO, USAID y WCS, y contó con la presencia de los miembros del Grupo científico especial, así como de expertos nacionales en el tratamiento de los brotes infecciosos. El Grupo actuó en carácter de Comité científico y de programación. Se presentaron monografías a los cuarenta delegados, provenientes de todo el mundo, por parte de científicos de la Argentina, Camboya, Indonesia, República Islámica de Irán, República de Corea, Nigeria, Federación Rusa, Ucrania y el Reino Unido, entre otros.

6. Se presentaron asimismo tópicos generales relacionados con la gripe aviar, incluyendo las actividades del TF; la situación actual de los países afectados por el virus; la vigilancia, la alerta precoz y la evaluación de los riesgos, y con cómo responder al interés de los medios de difusión en caso de que se produzca otro brote de la enfermedad.

7. La reunión llegó a la conclusión de que los brotes futuros tendrán que enfrentarse con presteza, con la intervención de expertos en las aves, conjuntamente con veterinarios y otros especialistas. Si bien las aves silvestres han sido infectadas en algunos casos, en opinión de los expertos presentes las aves de corral, la industria, y el comercio en aves de corral vivas y muertas disponen del poder de limitar cualquier propagación de la infección. Se emitió una lista de conclusiones y de recomendaciones fundamentales. (Anexo 1).

### **El taller sobre la gripe aviar**

8. Las deliberaciones del taller están disponibles en CD-ROM, o en AIWEb ([www.aiweb.info](http://www.aiweb.info)), el sitio oficial de TF en la red. Las mismas incluyen las conclusiones y las recomendaciones del taller y todos los documentos idóneos, tales como el concepto y la agenda, la lista de los participantes y la declaración de prensa. Figuran asimismo todas las presentaciones individuales, información sobre el TF, las organizaciones miembros y observadoras y todas las reuniones y publicaciones relacionadas con AI.

## **Declaración del Grupo especial: nuevos brotes de HPAI en Europa Central (13 de julio de 2007)**

9. En julio de 2007, el TF preparó conjuntamente una declaración oficial en comentario a los últimos brotes de H5N1 de junio y julio de 2007, cuando varias aves infectadas se encontraron muertas en días sucesivos en distintas partes de la República Checa, Alemania y Francia, tras un brote de H5N1 en un criadero de pavos checo. El TF dio por sentado en su declaración que los episodios en aves silvestres se vinculaban sin duda al brote en el criadero checo de pavos y que las aves silvestres no fueron probablemente los vectores principales de transmisión del virus, puesto que el brote se observó principalmente en especies no migratorias y durante el periodo sin migraciones. La declaración se publicó en el sitio AIWEb, en las páginas de la CMS y del AEWa y se distribuyó a los miembros del TF.

### **El folleto ‘La gripe aviar y las aves silvestres: ¿cuál es su papel efectivo en la propagación del virus?’**

10. El folleto titulado “La gripe aviar y las aves silvestres: ¿Cuál es su papel efectivo en la propagación del virus?” se publicó tras la primera reunión técnica del TF en Nairobi en 2006 y ofrece información concisa sobre el papel de las aves silvestres en la transmisión de H5N1. A la vez quiere presentar una opinión precisa y equilibrada de la relación entre las aves silvestres y la propagación del virus HPAI H5N1 en relación con otros mecanismos conocidos. Al final del mismo se detallan varias recomendaciones para acciones que reducen el riesgo de un avance ulterior de la gripe aviar, junto con una indicación de las necesidades urgentes de investigación que deberían salvar lagunas críticas en nuestro conocimiento del tema. El folleto está disponible en seis idiomas (inglés, francés, español, arábigo, chino y ruso) en versiones impresa y electrónica y la Secretaría CMS lo distribuyó a todos los miembros y observadores del TF, funcionarios de enlace nacionales de la CMS (Focal Points) y consejeros científicos. La versión actual del folleto fue revisada conjuntamente por todos los miembros del TF, para mantener al día su contenido y se volvió a imprimir en los seis idiomas mencionados. Por otra parte se prepare una versión en alemán del mismo folleto con el apoyo financiero de la rama alemana de CIC

### **Coordinación del Grupo especial**

11. Tal como se acordó en el taller de Aviemore y en la última teleconferencia, el TF será coordinado conjuntamente por la CMS y la FAO en el futuro. La coordinación conjunta se efectuará mediante una coparticipación en las labores, de modo que la FAO organizará las reuniones (teleconferencias, talleres, etc.) y la CMS mantendrá el sitio en la red AIWEb. La preparación de los documentos, las declaraciones de prensa, el material de información, etc. será responsabilidad conjunta según la experiencia disponible y la ocasión.

12. Se requieren más fondos para garantizar la continuación efectiva del trabajo del TF para los próximos meses. EL TF acordó que los fondos deben utilizarse principalmente para mantener el AIWEb, así como la coordinación de la comunicación y de las actividades. Se nombró a un nuevo funcionario a tiempo parcial responsable de la gripe aviar en la red, en febrero de 2007, por cuatro meses. El mismo fue reemplazado por otro, en julio, por tres meses más. El cargo fue entonces anunciado en la página en la red de la CMS y dentro de las organizaciones miembros del TF. A partir de octubre el puesto volvió a ocuparse por otros cuatro meses. Al respecto se requieren contribuciones financieras suplementarias en el futuro para las tareas de coordinación y también para avanzar con la planificación a largo plazo.

## **Miembros del Grupo especial**

13. Los recientes contactos por parte de varias organizaciones internacionales para participar en el TF han llevado a establecer un procedimiento oficial de adhesión al TF, para lo cual se preparó un formulario de solicitud que indica criterios de aceptación y formula preguntas generales sobre las organizaciones o instituciones y sobre sus metas u objetivos, las actividades vinculadas a AI e inquiriere sobre las razones para querer formar parte del TF. A fin de evitar que el TF crezca demasiado, se sugirió considerar una tercera categoría, la de miembro asociado. Con ellos se podría mantener un meollo pequeño que constituiría el grupo TF y se permitiría que otras organizaciones idóneas de AI fuesen miembros asociados. Además, también las personas individuales pueden ahora ser miembros del TF por razones de experiencia y capacidad propias.

## **El debate sobre la gripe aviar en la próxima reunión**

14. Durante la última teleconferencia el TF acordó preparar una declaración sobre aspectos científicos básicos para presentar a las reuniones siguientes. Esta declaración describe las vinculaciones entre la gripe aviar, las aves de corral, la salud humana, las aves silvestres, los humedales y el medio ambiente en general. Además se prepara un afiche que se presentará en las reuniones, con ilustraciones gráficas y con un resumen del texto de la declaración.

## **La gripe aviar, la fauna silvestre y el medio ambiente (AIWEb)**

15. Un proyecto, indispensable para reforzar las capacidades del TF de apoyarse en las recomendaciones de ambas reuniones técnicas ha sido la creación del sitio y portal AIWEb. Varias recomendaciones de la reunión se refirieron a la necesidad de recoger y diseminar información correcta sobre la dinámica y la propagación de AI en la fauna silvestre y para las campañas de concienciación pública a escala nacional e internacional. Las acciones requeridas se facilitarían mediante el desarrollo de una herramienta de comunicación basada en la red. Al respecto, AIWEb ha sido concebida como el centro de diseminación de la información del TF para la gripe aviar y las aves silvestres en la Internet. A falta de confirmación definitiva de apoyo financiero en ese momento, la CMS y AEWA han venido usando sus propios recursos y su personal para desarrollar el sistema AIWEb, así como las páginas del contenido básico para el TF. La estructura de AIWEb se estableció en colaboración con la División de comunicación e información pública del PNUMA (PNUMA/DCPI). La misma ofrece una plataforma pública para el intercambio de toda información y de las comunicaciones sobre los temas actuales y novedosos en relación con AI y las aves migratorias.

16. AIWEb existe desde el otoño de 2006 y, como ya se ha dicho, se dispone de fondos asegurados para su funcionamiento en un futuro próximo. El sitio en la red se pone al día periódicamente, tarea que incumbe al coordinador del TF. El monto de la información, que va de las contribuciones de palpitante actualidad y de los anuncios sobre aspectos relacionados con la gripe aviar a las novedades en la materia se ha incrementado notablemente. Se proyecta instalar un contador de consultas de AIWEb para evaluar su utilización. Para que resulte un recurso activo, al día y de utilidad para el TF, se requiere la colaboración de sus miembros, y que éstos contribuyan al sitio en la red, y se los invita e insta a que lo hagan. Por el momento se revisa la estructura de su página, con el fin de que resulte menos confusa.

## **Proyectos futuros del Grupo especial**

17. Amén de las teleconferencias regulares el TF proyecta organizar un taller sobre la gripe aviar en cooperación con Ramsar como un evento colateral en la próxima CoP9 en Roma en noviembre de 2008.

**Acción solicitada:**

Se invita al Comité Permanente a:

- (a) Ofrecer, con y mediante el Grupo científico especial sobre la gripe aviar, información idónea sobre las medidas prácticas que reduzcan el riesgo de transmisión de la enfermedad entre las aves silvestres, cautivas o domésticas, destinada a los demás organismos que preparen planes de gestión de emergencia y de humedales vinculados con HPAI;
- (b) Efectuar, junto con su Grupo de trabajo sobre las especies migratorias como vectores de enfermedades y con el Secretario Ejecutivo, recomendaciones relativas a la índole y extensión de los riesgos vinculados a otras enfermedades en las especies migratorias y sobre las posibles esferas de actividades a llevar a cabo por las partes contratantes a ese respecto;
- (c) Tomar nota de los progresos logrados desde la última reunión del Comité Permanente en setiembre de 2006 y continuar apoyando al Grupo especial en sus actividades de recaudación de fondos, que son indispensables para la continuación efectiva de sus tareas en el futuro.

# Avian Influenza and Wildlife Workshop 'Practical Lessons Learned'

Aviemore, Scotland, UK  
26-28 June 2007

## Conclusions and Recommendations

### KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION

An international workshop was convened by the Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds, and organised by the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and Scottish Natural Heritage. The Task Force was established in 2005 to create a liaison mechanism between those international organisations and intergovernmental environmental agreements engaged in activities related to the spread of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) of Asian lineage. It comprises representatives and observers from 14 international organisations, including four UN bodies.

The Task Force was set up out of a need for information on wild birds to be better reflected in the debate about H5N1 HPAI and its spread around the world. The activity of the multi-agency Task Force has been crucial to help develop collaborations and joint multidisciplinary work programmes, analyse findings, and enhance the effectiveness of responses. Since the Task Force's first meeting in 2005, there have been achievements in many areas.

The Aviemore workshop identified a number of important conclusions and recommendations for future action. A central theme running through most of these is the continuing need to further develop national inter-ministerial capacities within governments and inter-disciplinary collaborations elsewhere to respond to the challenges posed by H5N1 HPAI — not only in reacting to cases of disease occurrence, detection of infection, or outbreaks, but also preparing for these through contingency planning and risk assessment. Central to this activity is the close and integrated working of various elements of the governmental and non-governmental sectors, bringing together the complementary expertise of epidemiologists, veterinarians, virologists, biologists and ornithologists.

Whilst much attention has been focussed on H5N1 HPAI, other H5 and H7 HPAI subtypes, as well as other avian-borne diseases, also pose major risks for the poultry industry. Developing wildlife surveillance programmes and enhancing biosecurity in relation to avian influenza raises issues common to risks from other zoonoses<sup>1</sup>. The workshop stressed the need to take longer-term, inter-disciplinary and integrated perspectives in responding to the challenges posed by all these diseases.

#### Contingency planning, risk assessment and response strategies

1. The workshop condemned the continued misplaced practice of actively killing wild birds or destroying their nest sites and wetland habitats in response to disease detection or perception. This is contrary to the recommendations of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), World Health Organisation (WHO) and also of the Contracting Parties to intergovernmental treaties such as the Ramsar Convention on wetlands, the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA). Such approaches to the prevention or control of HPAI are wasteful, damaging to conservation and have no scientific basis. They may also exacerbate the problem by causing further dispersion of infected birds. It highlights the need for policy and management decisions to be based on evidence.

---

<sup>1</sup> such as Japanese encephalitis, West Nile virus infections, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, Equine encephalidities (Venezuelan, Eastern or Western).

2. There is an important and urgent need to develop national preparedness plans through drafting broad-ranging contingency measures. These should involve not only statutory and other regulatory authorities but also those of the non-governmental sector. Scenario-setting and training exercises are critical to enhance understanding of issues and the responses that will be necessary in the event of disease or infection detection in the country.
3. National contingency planning and preparedness require strong inter-agency/ministry collaboration as well as political support within governments from the highest levels possible. The inter-disciplinary joint collaboration of different ministries (to include at a minimum, Agriculture, Environment, Forestry, and Health), and organisations directly results in greater capacity and complementary expertise. Specifically, those ministries and agencies with authority and expertise with wild bird science and management need to be included in contingency planning.
4. Guidance on best practice contingency planning should be further developed by relevant international organisations including FAO and OIE. The collation and publication of 'best practice' case studies would be valuable.
5. There continues to be a need to learn from each case of infection by H5N1 HPAI. This would greatly assist with developing better understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 HPAI. It is important that there should be routine inclusion of ornithological experts in field outbreak investigation or response teams, including at poultry farms. The development of national and international registers of experts able to assist in such missions would be valuable. There is a need to add from a wildlife perspective, protocols that supplement current outbreak investigations at poultry farms, in order to evaluate the role that wild birds may play in disease introduction there, or the potential for disease to be spread from farms into wild bird populations.
6. There is a need to develop international best practice guidance related to responses to cases or outbreaks of infection in wild birds with specific considerations for those events occurring in protected areas or nature reserves. This includes guidance on measures to reduce risks at sites of conservation importance for susceptible birds. The Task Force should help stimulate such guidance.
7. A 'lessons learnt' review should always be undertaken following the application of an HPAI contingency plan and/or outbreak of infection, and any conclusions concerning how better to improve responses or preparedness subsequently implemented.
8. There is a need to integrate responses and strategies for avian influenza and similar zoonoses into Agreements and Action Plans developed under the Convention on Migratory Species, such as *inter alia*, the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement and the Siberian Crane Memorandum of Understanding.

### **Surveillance and early warning systems**

9. Poor identification and reporting to the OIE remains a major concern. Analysis of recent reports to OIE where wildlife are part of the outbreak or die-off records, often lack species identification using binomial standard nomenclature, information on the precise location and timing of infection, as well as the means by which cases are detected. These deficiencies constrain improved analysis in understanding of the H5N1 HPAI epidemiology[0]. Task Force members should draft a letter to the OIE Scientific or Standards Committee for submission by the Task Force Chair to request the OIE in enhancing member country's reporting in these respects and so improve the quality of data registered and disseminated. Photographic documentation of affected species should be strongly promoted. The European Commission has developed valuable standards related to the photography of wild birds as an aid to identification. These should be considered for inclusion in relevant FAO and OIE best-practice manuals and other international guidelines. Furthermore, exact reporting of outbreak locations rather than the location of the reporting institute or ministry should be strongly promoted.

10. Openly accessible data and information on the location and extent of avian influenza surveillance, and results in wild birds is important to help build international understanding of the ecology of this virus. To this end, there would be clear benefit to expanding the use of the Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance (GAINS) open database and mapping system to be included as the desirable wild bird module of the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS) for transboundary animal diseases, including zoonoses— a joint initiative of FAO, OIE and WHO. Additionally, the GAINS information management system has the potential to serve the needs of many stakeholders and would benefit from more widespread mandates for its use and recognition by the relevant major organisational stakeholders, in particular FAO, OIE, WHO, UNEP, Wetlands International and Birdlife International.
11. Understanding shared data is only possible if these represent the same information. In this respect the development of international common standards is particularly important, not only as these relate to field-based methodologies (e.g. different types of sampling) but also to laboratory diagnostic techniques. The continued development of guidance from FAO and others is essential.
12. It is highly desirable that long-term programmes for avian influenza surveillance (H5N1 HPAI and other LPAI) are established against precisely defined objectives. These will help give a better understanding of incidence of AI in healthy wild birds. Establishment of such programmes will be difficult (e.g. in relation to the expected very low prevalence of AI viruses) but nonetheless continuity is an important objective.
13. FAO guidance on the planning and execution of avian influenza surveillance programmes should be further developed, possibly producing separate products for different target audiences. This might also include simplified publications for field audiences.
14. Whilst historically most research into avian influenza has related to ducks, geese, swans and waders, surveillance in the Far East has increasingly detected H5N1 HPAI in a number of other dead birds, traded birds, scavengers and predators. Some of these species, especially those that live in association with people, have the potential to act as 'bridge' species and as foci of infection. Whilst maintaining focus on waterbird surveillance, it is important that such species are included in surveillance programmes where risks are high or disease occurrence is entrenched in the poultry sector, or the disease has become endemic in the country or region.
15. The development of more strategic approaches to surveillance at regional or wider scales should be encouraged through appropriate mechanisms. Parameters to be considered in such developments include *inter alia* migratory patterns of higher risk species and the risk of such species mixing either with other wild species and/or with poultry. This should be followed up by capacity development in terms of establishing logistic as well as human resource competence. In the short-term, this is perhaps most feasible for developed countries, from where learning and programmes can be transferred to other regions.

### **Epidemiology: tracing sources of infection**

16. The ultimate objective of structured epidemiological investigations of outbreaks in domestic poultry should be to identify the most likely source of infection so that the population attributable risk can be quantified. This allows assessment of the population attributable risks as related to the potential means of introduction of infection to domestic flocks so that this can then be used to estimate the proportionate rôle of the various potential means of introduction of infection, e.g. poultry, poultry products, fomite transmission, wild birds, etc. This allows the most relevant and efficient control measures to be put in place.
17. A central element of national contingency planning should be the establishment of multi-disciplinary epidemiological teams which should involve epidemiological, veterinary, virological, biological and ornithological expertise. There are good examples of the success of this approach which demonstrates the advantage of bringing together expert ornithologists



so as to be able to advise veterinarians and epidemiologists. The establishment of such national Ornithological Expert Panels is strongly recommended.

18. There are massive international movements of poultry and poultry products, although full details of these are poor, especially for informal or illegal trade. It remains an important priority to develop better information about the national and international trade in poultry and poultry products at various scales, including transparency issues in industry – which calls for a healthy dialogue to be promoted. As part of the process of tracing bird movements it would be valuable to undertake more field research on market chains and sales so as to better understand the nature and extent of the poultry or ornamental bird trade, fighting cock exhibits, and the like, as well as giving special emphasis to trade through wet (live bird) markets.
19. The Task Force should stimulate the development of accessible guidance which gives general principles for epidemiological investigations related to a range of different outbreak and infection scenarios, as well as best practice case studies, which would have educational value.
20. Training in epidemiological principles is important, especially where there is limited national capacity. Organisations represented on the Task Force should consider how they might assist the development of such training.
21. In regions where synthesised information on the distribution and movements of wild birds do not exist, there remains an important need to gather, collate and provide such information to aid both epidemiologists and decision makers. This should include tools that summarise the likely bird movements at various scales and for various periods.
22. Telemetry provides a valuable tool for better understanding of temporal and spatial movements of wild birds especially in relation to epidemiological investigations. The further use of this technology should be promoted.
23. To more readily understand the spread of infection it is crucial that there is accurate knowledge of the timing and sequence of events ('time-lines'). Time-lines, together with an understanding of which species are involved and exact locational information are all crucial to the generation of hypotheses that can then be used to direct subsequent epidemiological investigations and conduct meaningful phylogenetic studies based on genome sequencing data. The importance of rapid, official reporting to OIE was stressed.
24. The results of epidemiological investigations should always be published, including where these are inconclusive. Awareness of these would be facilitated by establishing hyperlinks to an international register of such investigations maintained on OIE's web-site. All organisations involved in the Task Force should continue to encourage transparency in reporting and openness in data sharing. The reporting of negative data is crucially important.

### **Communication, education and public awareness**

25. Those involved with avian influenza should proactively work with the media to enhance the accuracy of their reporting of science, thus improving public understanding. This should particularly involve the communication of positive messages as well as responses to negative ones. To this end, targeted briefings of journalists are helpful. The development of much more effective communication strategies is necessary to give policy makers, stakeholders and the general public more balanced information on the real levels of risk and appropriate responses.
26. Organisations should identify specific, informed members of their staff who are responsible for media briefings and who work on a contingency and communications planning. They should expect the unexpected and prepare for it. They should stick to areas of expertise and avoid comment about other issues. Briefing of media should always be evidence-based and avoid speculation in the absence of evidence. The accuracy of facts supplied by others should be

repeatedly checked before passing these to the media. Much useful information is available on the Task Force web-site ([www.aiweb.info](http://www.aiweb.info)).

27. Task Force members should use the booklet *Avian Influenza and Wild Birds* for media briefings and promote its use by others. It should be reviewed and updated as necessary. English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic versions are now available. However, the Task Force should also develop a media 'tool kit' that brings together national and organisational media best practice and Frequently Asked Questions. This should include factual information that may be adapted for specific national needs and uses.
28. At present much guidance related to H5N1 HPAI is published in a limited range of languages. It is important to translate guidance into a wider range of other, and more local, languages so as to facilitate its dissemination.
29. The Task Force should stimulate the publication of simple bird identification guides in local languages so as to assist field-based staff responses to cases of infection. A web-based list or directory of experts that could assist (at a distance) in identification of bird species based on photographs would also be highly desirable.
30. The degradation of the health of ecosystems as documented by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and especially in the decline in extent and condition of wetlands is considered to have had a rôle in the evolution and spread of H5N1HPAI. This environmental change has created the conditions where there is closer contact and mixing between people, livestock (including poultry and domestic ducks), and wild waterbirds, potentially resulting in cross-infections. Reducing the opportunities for such contacts through preventing further loss of wetlands, improving mechanisms for the maintenance and wise use of wetlands is an important long-term requirement. To this end it would be valuable to develop and disseminate practical guidance, *inter alia* in collaboration with the Ramsar Convention.

### **Research and data needs**

31. There remains a need to develop a better understanding of the behaviour and ecology of 'bridge' species, as well as other means of the local or short distance spread of HPAI infection, such that this information might be used to develop enhanced guidance on biosecurity and contribute to risk analysis
32. It would be valuable to have a better understanding of the duration of viral shedding by bird species likely to be held in captivity. This would inform possible response strategies for zoos and collections in the event of infection outbreaks.
33. Better monitoring and surveillance for avian influenza within markets that trade in wildlife, is highly desirable. This should include research into which species are traded, their origins and movements.
34. There remains a need for better information on relevant cultural and religious practices, such as the widespread purchase and release into the wild of birds at certain times of the year (*e.g.* merit releases), and how those practices might be safeguarded but at the same time, minimize the risk of disease spread to humans, wild birds, and poultry.
35. H5N1 HPAI has affected several non-avian species, although knowledge of its ecology in these taxa is particular poor. Those species that have been infected are thought to be accidental, dead-end hosts, and there is no current evidence for them being involved in the maintenance of infection in any area. However, there is a need to continue to assess this issue during epidemiological investigations as it is possible that in the future a mammalian species may become a maintenance host and thus spread H5N1 HPAI locally.
36. Knowledge of the degree to which H5N1 HPAI may be passed between different bird species (and whether this happens asymptotically or not) is important information that could help refine risk assessments. Research which leads to the development of serological tests for avian influenza antibodies in different species of birds will ultimately provide the most useful epidemiological information. Serological testing in past LPAI outbreaks has given important

insights. Basic research on the immunological responses to H5N1 HPAI infection by birds (possibly using a representative avian model in one species) is important. A current priority is to develop validated serological diagnostic tests for the full range of bird species potentially at risk.

37. There remains a need to continue to gather, collate and co-ordinate data and information on wild bird distributions, their movements, stop-over sites and flyways. Satellite telemetry is a particularly valuable tool for this work. It is also important to continue to gather data at site level, since such local information is very limited in many parts of the world.
38. For many, access to the most recent scientific literature is constrained by inability to subscribe to expensive on-line journals, thus hindering understanding. The Task Force should help tackle this issue, possibly by working with authors to make the most relevant scientific literature available on [AIWeB](#) and web-based resources, or by investigating the potential for corporate sponsorship.

## **Finances**

39. Recent events with respect to avian influenza have focussed attention on the need for resources to develop national veterinary capacity and programmes of surveillance and monitoring for wildlife diseases, especially zoonoses, but also to develop background information on wild birds, and especially their movements. A good start has been made, but there remains the need for further investments, particular to allow the development of the wildlife disease sector.
40. The Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza has provided a valuable co-ordination function between its many collaborating organisations. Financial resources are required to facilitate its continued operation.

# Avian Influenza and Wildlife Workshop 'Practical Lessons Learned'

Aviemore, Scotland, UK  
26-28 June 2007

## 1. Introduction

An international workshop was convened by the Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds, and organised by the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and Scottish Natural Heritage. The Task Force was established in 2005 to create a liaison mechanism between those international organisations and intergovernmental environmental agreements engaged in activities related to the spread of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) of Asian lineage. It comprises representatives and observers from 14 international organisations, including four UN bodies.

The Task Force was set up out of a need for information on wild birds to be better reflected in the debate about H5N1 HPAI and its spread around the world. It has had eight teleconferences and works also by e-mail and meetings. The activity of the multi-agency Task Force has been crucial to help develop collaborations and joint work programmes, and has thus enhanced the effectiveness of responses.

The objective of the Aviemore workshop in June 2006 was specifically to review practical issues arising, and lessons learnt, from recent outbreaks. The Aviemore workshop identified a number of important conclusions and recommendations for future action. It also brought together a summary of available guidance on a range of relevant topics (Annex 1). It reviewed also progress since the first meeting of the Task Force in Nairobi in April 2005 as detailed in Annex 2.

A central theme running through most of these conclusions and recommendations is the continuing need to further develop national capacities within government and elsewhere to respond to the challenges posed by H5N1 HPAI — not only in responding to outbreaks, but also preparing for these through contingency planning and risk assessment. Central to this activity is the close and integrated working of both governmental and non-governmental sectors — specifically the bringing together of the complementary expertise of epidemiologists, veterinarians, virologists, biologists and ornithologists.

Whilst much attention has been focussed on H5N1 HPAI, other H5 and H7 HPAI subtypes also pose major risks for the poultry industry. Indeed, developing wildlife surveillance programmes and enhancing biosecurity raise issues common to responses to other zoonoses. The workshop stressed the need to take longer-term and integrated perspectives in responding to the challenges posed by these diseases.

## 2. Contingency planning, risk assessment and response strategies

### Conclusions

- The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) [Manual on the preparation of national animal disease emergency preparedness plans](#) recommends the development of four sets of complementary technical contingency plans:
  1. specific disease contingency plans that document the strategies to be followed in order to detect, contain and eliminate the disease;
  2. standard operating procedures that may be common to several or all emergency disease campaigns;

3. enterprise manuals that set out zoosanitary guidelines for enterprises that may be involved in an emergency animal disease outbreak; and
  4. simple job description cards for all individual officers.
- It remains a pressing issue to build the capacity and develop appropriate organisational structures for veterinary services in developing countries so as to be able effectively to respond to outbreaks of H5N1 HPAI outbreaks, particularly in domestic poultry. Indeed, there has been considerable past investment in trying to develop national veterinary capacity. Recognising the central importance of this need, the meeting identified however that governance issues historically had meant that such investments had not always delivered anticipated benefits. Good governance and the elimination of corruption are crucial to maximise return on investments in capacity development, and thus allow the delivery of more effective responses. It is crucial that the further development of veterinary capacity should be undertaken against specifically defined objectives and should result in change.
  - In developing national contingency planning, it is essential that countries put in place effective and flexible mechanisms for inter-agency co-ordination and action backed at the highest possible political/Ministerial level. This should especially co-ordinate between the various government ministries and departments likely to be involved (typically of Agriculture and Environment).
  - Countries should be encouraged to name a central Avian Influenza focal point for liaison with the Task Force, so that when outbreaks occur, the Task Force can then disseminate relevant information to the focal point (and *vice versa*).

### **Poultry holdings**

- Integrated analyses that relate distribution and numbers of poultry to that of waterbirds have considerable potential to maximise the likelihood of identifying higher risk areas where surveillance of wild birds can then be focussed. A good example of such an integrated study was presented from the [UK](#), and this approach has also been undertaken in some other European countries. In doing this, dialogue with the poultry industry is important to understand and fully reflect the appropriate risk factors for poultry holdings. FAO's Technical Co-operation Programmes have undertaken similar attempts for Africa and Latin America but data limitations related to wild birds still give challenges.
- Ornithologists and ecologists should always be involved in outbreak response teams, as well as with surveillance programmes. Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that their technical expertise can provide valuable insights into possible epidemiological lines of investigation. The Task Force should strategically address how best to convince veterinary authorities of this need and the resulting benefit to them.
- Where stamping out occurs, particular care needs to be taken in the biosecure disposal of infected carcasses (and other sources of virus contaminated fomites), so as to avoid the risk of the infection of scavenging birds or mammals.
- The potential spread of infection by professionals and others risk (e.g. vaccination or veterinary investigation teams) moving between infected and uninfected holdings is also a major risk.
- Practical experience in Africa has shown that early reporting of outbreaks will be encouraged by rapid payment of compensation, which should be uniform across a country or region to avoid encouraging the movement of (infected) poultry to areas which have higher rates of compensation. An adequate level of financial compensation is important if early reporting of infection is to be encouraged, and these rates should be regularly reviewed against market prices.
- Sustained public sensitisation and awareness programmes are essential to any control and containment programme.

- The experience of some Asian countries, where H5N1 HPAI is now endemic, suggests that it is unlikely that this virus will be readily eliminated in the poultry sector unless concerted action is taken at many levels. As documented elsewhere, a range of responses are available to reduce levels of infection: “In tackling this disease, countries should adopt integrated control programs using the combination of measures best suited to the local environment<sup>2</sup>.”

### **Nature reserves and wild birds**

- The workshop learnt with great concern of continued misplaced responses in some countries, including the active killing of wild birds in response to infection within a country. To further highlight the inappropriateness of such practices, in many cases extensive killing has occurred in places remote from any poultry potentially at risk.
- There would be benefit in developing and disseminating international good practice guidance related to risk assessment and outbreak response planning at nature reserves and other protected areas, especially for sites of conservation importance for birds. These assessments are best undertaken in the context of site management plans, aiming to identify and manage risks towards key conservation values (e.g. threatened species) at such sites. Ideally, risk assessment and management measures should be linked to the wide range of existing relevant guidance developed by the Ramsar Convention on wetlands. In particular, stakeholder communication and participation is critical.
- There is limited FAO guidance related to the dealing with outbreaks or identification of isolated cases of H5N1 HPAI infection in wild birds. It is recommended that guidance on this complementary to that already existing be issued urgently.
- The unnecessary closure of nature reserves and other protected areas when no outbreaks have occurred at the site should always be avoided. This is in accordance with much of the scientific data available on the low frequency of the H5N1 HPAI occurrence within wild bird populations, and the lack of evidence that wild birds play a significant rôle in the spread and transmission of infection of H5N1 to humans.

### **Zoos and animal collections**

- Highly pathogenic avian influenza poses a particular risk to zoological collections in terms of: staff and visitors health and safety issues; threats to susceptible captive animals of conservation importance; the animal welfare implications of both the disease and disease control actions; and in terms of financial impact (expenditure for contingency planning and potential reduction of income from, for example, reduced visitation). There have been cases of H5N1 HPAI infection reported from within zoos in at least seven countries<sup>3</sup> since 2003. In some cases, infected poultry products fed to carnivores were the most likely source of infection, but the source of most introductions remains unknown.
- Potential impacts can be minimised by rigorous risk assessments and thorough contingency planning. It is essential that zoos and collections develop detailed contingency plans using a dedicated multidisciplinary team. Such plans should address the multiple sources of risk faced, as well as planning necessary responses. These include:
  - Staff and visitor health and safety based on minimising contact between humans and birds or their products, and/or improving hygiene measures.
  - Protection of captive stock by means of enhanced biosecurity and possible vaccination although the latter option raises a number of issues that need careful consideration.
  - Communication strategies for staff, visitors, external stakeholders and the media.
  - Operational aspects e.g. guides, educational staff, shops, restaurants, sales, etc.
  - Access to site e.g. staff living on site, contractors, other site-users, etc.
  - Closure of zoo if necessary plus a strategy for re-opening.
  - Business aspects to redress financial impact.

---

<sup>2</sup> Sims, L.D. 2007. Lessons learned from Asian H5N1 outbreak control. *Avian Diseases* 50: 174-181.

<sup>3</sup> Thailand, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Ukraine and Germany.

Plans need continued review and updating particularly in light of new information regarding epidemiology, changing legislation and to reflect internal organisational changes.

- Scenario setting, staff training and formal exercises involving relevant statutory and other organisations or veterinary authorities that are engaged with private or public collections are absolutely essential to developing preparedness plans. Such exercises should include follow-up activities with those involved to develop lessons-learned and the corrective measures to be taken (including mechanisms to ensure compliance).
- It is particularly important to establish good communication networks *before* infection crises occur, such that there is clear understanding of the issues related to a specific zoo or animal collection by all those potentially involved in responses.
- A fundamental aspect of good biosecurity in zoos and collections is a ban on the feeding of actually, or potentially, diseased/infected poultry to carnivores.

### **Key recommendations for future action**

1. The workshop condemned the continued misplaced practice of actively killing wild birds or destroying their nest sites and wetland habitats in response to disease detection or perception. This is contrary to the recommendations of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), World Health Organisation (WHO) and also of the Contracting Parties to intergovernmental treaties such as the Ramsar Convention on wetlands, the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA). Such approaches to the prevention or control of HPAI are wasteful, damaging to conservation and have no scientific basis. They may also exacerbate the problem by causing further dispersion of infected birds. It highlights the need for policy and management decisions to be based on evidence.
2. There is an important and urgent need to develop national preparedness plans through drafting broad-ranging contingency measures. These should involve not only statutory and other regulatory authorities but also those of the non-governmental sector. Scenario-setting and training exercises are critical to enhance understanding of issues and the responses that will be necessary in the event of disease or infection detection in the country.
3. National contingency planning and preparedness require strong inter-agency/ministry collaboration as well as political support within governments from the highest levels possible. The inter-disciplinary joint collaboration of different ministries (to include at a minimum, Agriculture, Environment, Forestry, and Health), and organisations directly results in greater capacity and complementary expertise. Specifically, those ministries and agencies with authority and expertise with wild bird science and management need to be included in contingency planning.
4. Guidance on best practice contingency planning should be further developed by relevant international organisations including FAO and OIE. The collation and publication of 'best practice' case studies would be valuable.
5. There continues to be a need to learn from each case of infection by H5N1 HPAI. This would greatly assist with developing better understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 HPAI. It is important that there should be routine inclusion of ornithological experts in field outbreak investigation or response teams, including at poultry farms. The development of national and international registers of experts able to assist in such missions would be valuable. There is a need to add from a wildlife perspective, protocols that supplement current outbreak investigations at poultry farms, in order to evaluate the role that wild birds may play in disease introduction there, or the potential for disease to be spread from farms into wild bird populations.
6. There is a need to develop international best practice guidance related to responses to cases or outbreaks of infection in wild birds with specific considerations for those events occurring in protected areas or nature reserves. This includes guidance on measures to reduce risks at

sites of conservation importance for susceptible birds. The Task Force should help stimulate such guidance.

7. A 'lessons learnt' review should always be undertaken following the application of an HPAI contingency plan and/or outbreak of infection, and any conclusions concerning how better to improve responses or preparedness subsequently implemented.
8. There is a need to integrate responses and strategies for avian influenza and similar zoonoses into Agreements and Action Plans developed under the Convention on Migratory Species, such as *inter alia*, the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement and the Siberian Crane Memorandum of Understanding.

### **3. Surveillance and early warning systems**

#### **Conclusions**

- The development of practical programmes of training and capacity development by FAO, Wetlands International, the UK Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust (WWT), the Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD) and others has been a very welcome step forward. Such programmes need to be sustained and further developed, recognising that single training courses by themselves are insufficient to develop significant long-term capacity. Follow-up is essential.
- The development of FAO guidance on the development of surveillance programmes is welcome but needs to be further developed based on lessons learnt from practical experience.
- Whilst differing national circumstances and capacity will dictate the exact arrangements for national surveillance programmes, the experience of some countries demonstrates significant benefits if surveillance is systematically organised through a single organisation. This can lead to high efficiency in organisation and quality assurance, facilitates logistic support and effective supply chains, and allows for rapid communication with all those involved.
- The issue of species identification of birds affected by AI remains problematic, with significant numbers of apparently misidentified species being reported. This remains also a problem with the quality of formal national reporting to, and international reporting by, OIE — possibly caused by the fact that higher quality information is provided in free text fields, which are not included in the standard OIE reports. Rather, in these reports the strongly categorized standard 'questionnaire' is used as the main source and this system is not the most useful one in gathering precise information on species identify.
- Inclusion of photographs are essential to assist confirmation of cage-birds which are usually non-native to the country concerned. It is important that birds either captured for active AI surveillance, or reported by the public in the context of AI, are identified by trained ornithologists. In the event of doubts as to identity, digital photographs should be taken and these stored with reference to the sample until virological testing is completed. (If such information was not collected at the time of capture, this allows additional information such as age and sex of birds to be assessed). Where trained ornithologists are not present (for example dead birds sent direct to laboratories for testing), photographs should **always** be taken to allow identification by knowledgeable personnel. The European Commission has published technical guidance as to how best to take such photos (Annex 3B). There would be benefits in this guidance being translated and more widely promulgated as an international best practice.
- To begin to develop a better understanding of what comprises 'unusual mortality' — often used as a trigger for the collection and sampling of carcasses — it would be valuable for surveys of waterbirds to start to collect data on the numbers of dead birds found during routine surveys to obtain baseline values in a given ecosystem during a given time of the year.



- In some countries the public have been involved in the reporting of dead birds. Experience has demonstrated benefit in developing clear guidance to help agencies to respond to such reports: having a clear, rule-based system helps reduce public misunderstandings.

### **Key recommendations for future action**

1. Poor identification and reporting to the OIE remains a major concern. Analysis of recent reports to OIE where wildlife are part of the outbreak or die-off records, often lack species identification using binomial standard nomenclature, information on the precise location and timing of infection, as well as the means by which cases are detected. These deficiencies constrain improved analysis in understanding of the H5N1 HPAI epidemiology[0]. Task Force members should draft a letter to the OIE Scientific or Standards Committee for submission by the Task Force Chair to request the OIE in enhancing member country's reporting in these respects and so improve the quality of data registered and disseminated. Photographic documentation of affected species should be strongly promoted. The European Commission has developed valuable standards related to the photography of wild birds as an aid to identification. These should be considered for inclusion in relevant FAO and OIE best-practice manuals and other international guidelines. Furthermore, exact reporting of outbreak locations rather than the location of the reporting institute or ministry should be strongly promoted.
2. Openly accessible data and information on the location and extent of avian influenza surveillance, and results in wild birds is important to help build international understanding of the ecology of this virus. To this end, there would be clear benefit to expanding the use of the Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance (GAINS) open database and mapping system to be included as the desirable wild bird module of the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS) for transboundary animal diseases, including zoonoses— a joint initiative of FAO, OIE and WHO. Additionally, the GAINS information management system has the potential to serve the needs of many stakeholders and would benefit from more widespread mandates for its use and recognition by the relevant major organisational stakeholders, in particular FAO, OIE, WHO, UNEP, Wetlands International and Birdlife International.
3. Understanding shared data is only possible if these represent the same information. In this respect the development of international common standards is particularly important, not only as these relate to field-based methodologies (e.g. different types of sampling) but also to laboratory diagnostic techniques. The continued development of guidance from FAO and others is essential.
4. It is highly desirable that long-term programmes for avian influenza surveillance (H5N1 HPAI and other LPAI) are established against precisely defined objectives. These will help give a better understanding of incidence of AI in healthy wild birds. Establishment of such programmes will be difficult (e.g. in relation to the expected very low prevalence of AI viruses) but nonetheless continuity is an important objective.
5. FAO guidance on the planning and execution of avian influenza surveillance programmes should be further developed, possibly producing separate products for different target audiences. This might also include simplified publications for field audiences.
6. Whilst historically most research into avian influenza has related to ducks, geese, swans and waders, surveillance in the Far East has increasingly detected H5N1 HPAI in a number of other dead birds, traded birds, scavengers and predators. Some of these species, especially those that live in association with people, have the potential to act as 'bridge' species and as foci of infection. Whilst maintaining focus on waterbird surveillance, it is important that such species are included in surveillance programmes where risks are high or disease occurrence is entrenched in the poultry sector, or the disease has become endemic in the country or region.
7. The development of more strategic approaches to surveillance at regional or wider scales should be encouraged through appropriate mechanisms. Parameters to be considered in

such developments include *inter alia* migratory patterns of higher risk species and the risk of such species mixing either with other wild species and/or with poultry. This should be followed up by capacity development in terms of establishing logistic as well as human resource competence. In the short-term, this is perhaps most feasible for developed countries, from where learning and programmes can be transferred to other regions.

## **4. Epidemiology: tracing sources of infection**

### **Conclusions**

Integrated epidemiological investigations of occurrences of HPAI infection are fundamental to a better understanding of the natural history of H5N1 HPAI with the objective of reducing the risk of further infection: thus alleviating consequent social and economic impacts. These should explore the multiple possible paths by which this viral infection is known to be transmitted. The following issues are of high priority:

- As a component of national contingency planning, multi-disciplinary teams involving veterinary, epidemiological, biological, ornithological and other relevant expertise should be established in advance of cases of infection. These should include expertise from both governmental and non-governmental sectors.
- There remains an urgent need for better data related to the national and international trade in, and movements of, poultry and poultry products so that this information can be used in epidemiological modelling. Relevant data-bases related to poultry trade covering a range of scales from local to national and international should be established in liaison with the industry. In collecting such data, it will be important to explain to relevant stakeholders why it is required and seek their engagement.
- Avian influenza has been detected within captive birds in wildlife markets, highlighting a general lack of information about these areas as potential sources of infection. Better information on wildlife trade together with enhanced surveillance within markets is highly desirable.
- Epidemiological investigations should consider linkages to wild birds as one of the possible sources of infection. Given that common things happen more frequently, such considerations should not emphasise exceptional or unlikely possibilities.
- There is a need for better epidemiological quantification of the numbers of outbreaks in domestic birds related to the various potential means of the introduction of infection.
- In regions where synthesised information on the distribution and movements of wild birds do not exist, there remain important needs to provide such information to aid both epidemiologists and decision makers. This should include tools that summarise likely movements at various scales and for various periods.
- To more readily understand the spread of infection it is crucial that there is accurate knowledge of the timing<sup>4</sup> and sequence of events ('time-lines'). Time-lines, together with an understanding of which species are involved and exact locational information, are crucial to the generation of hypotheses that can then be used to direct subsequent epidemiological investigations. The importance of rapid and accurate official national reporting to OIE was stressed.

---

<sup>4</sup> To this end, the importance of clearly understanding what activities reported dates relate to was stressed. Different dates may be reported for the same samples depending on whether this refers to the date on which the sample was collected, the date it was submitted for laboratory testing, when it was tested, or even when the results were finally reported.

- The interpretation of cases of infection in wild birds is greatly aided by the collection of contextual information. The European Commission has published guidance which summarises key information which should be collected (Annex 3A).
- The open sharing of data and information of data related to infection — both positive and negative — is critical. Yet it was recognised that in some countries and cultures there can often be strong pressures which militate against such transparency for various motives, including potential negative impacts on inward investment, or for commercial advantage. Overcoming such difficult barriers to the ready exchange and reporting of data (both within and between countries) is a crucially important issue that will require sustained and concerted efforts from all those involved.
- The provision of specialist ornithological advice to epidemiologists and other government officials responding to outbreaks is essential. Better international understanding of the various national advisory groups would allow rapid communication between national ornithological advisory groups at a regional scale (*e.g.* within Europe) so that specialist assessments and other information can be rapidly shared between countries.
- The development of epidemiological expertise in countries with limited relevant capacity would be greatly aided both by the development of guidance which outlines basic principles, together with case studies which demonstrate good practice. Care should be taken to avoid making such guidance too prescriptive so as to avoid limiting the creativity of epidemiological teams — given that many outbreaks may have unique features. There may be a need to develop different forms of guidance for developed and developing countries, and/or to differentiate between data-rich and data-poor countries.

Examples were given of a situation where the combination of several improbable events had combined to result in a case of infection. In investigating sources of infection, it is important not to jump to conclusions in the absence of thorough epidemiological investigations.

The international reporting of low quality data and information especially related to species identification continues to be a major issue. The situation has not improved over the last three years, with only 36% of all 1,671 OIE official reports identified to species level in 2006<sup>5</sup>. This involves issues related both to how information is collected by countries and reported to OIE, as well as how some of this information is then subsequently reported by OIE. The meeting identified several simple ways by which aspects of quality assurance could readily be built into the reporting chain<sup>6</sup> and strongly recommended that OIE take an initiative to enhance the quality of data-reporting, working with Task Force members. In doing this, consideration needs also to be given as to how countries can be better motivated to report higher quality, and more precise data and information.

### **Key recommendations for future action**

1. The ultimate objective of structured epidemiological investigations of outbreaks in domestic poultry should be to identify the most likely source of infection so that the population attributable risk can be quantified. This allows assessment of the population attributable risks as related to the potential means of introduction of infection to domestic flocks so that this can then be used to estimate the proportionate rôle of the various potential means of introduction of infection, *e.g.* poultry, poultry products, fomite transmission, wild birds, *etc.* This allows the most relevant and efficient control measures to be put in place.
2. A central element of national contingency planning should be the establishment of multi-disciplinary epidemiological teams which should involve epidemiological, veterinary, virological, biological and ornithological expertise. There are good examples of the success of this approach which demonstrates the advantage of bringing together expert ornithologists so as to be able to advise veterinarians and epidemiologists. The establishment of such national Ornithological Expert Panels is strongly recommended.

---

<sup>5</sup> R. Lee, WWT (unpublished)

<sup>6</sup> for example by having one form specifically for the reporting of avian influenza, which is specifically designed to avoid ambiguity and which would allow for the assessment of data quality.

3. There are massive international movements of poultry and poultry products, although full details of these are poor, especially for informal or illegal trade. It remains an important priority to develop better information about the national and international trade in poultry and poultry products at various scales, including transparency issues in industry – which calls for a healthy dialogue to be promoted. As part of the process of tracing bird movements it would be valuable to undertake more field research on market chains and sales so as to better understand the nature and extent of the poultry or ornamental bird trade, fighting cock exhibits, and the like, as well as giving special emphasis to trade through wet (live bird) markets.
4. The Task Force should stimulate the development of accessible guidance which gives general principles for epidemiological investigations related to a range of different outbreak and infection scenarios, as well as best practice case studies, which would have educational value.
5. Training in epidemiological principles is important, especially where there is limited national capacity. Organisations represented on the Task Force should consider how they might assist the development of such training.
6. In regions where synthesised information on the distribution and movements of wild birds do not exist, there remains an important need to gather, collate and provide such information to aid both epidemiologists and decision makers. This should include tools that summarise the likely bird movements at various scales and for various periods.
7. Telemetry provides a valuable tool for better understanding of temporal and spatial movements of wild birds especially in relation to epidemiological investigations. The further use of this technology should be promoted.
8. To more readily understand the spread of infection it is crucial that there is accurate knowledge of the timing and sequence of events ('time-lines'). Time-lines, together with an understanding of which species are involved and exact locational information are all crucial to the generation of hypotheses that can then be used to direct subsequent epidemiological investigations and conduct meaningful phylogenetic studies based on genome sequencing data. The importance of rapid, official reporting to OIE was stressed.
9. The results of epidemiological investigations should always be published, including where these are inconclusive. Awareness of these would be facilitated by establishing hyperlinks to an international register of such investigations maintained on OIE's web-site. All organisations involved in the Task Force should continue to encourage transparency in reporting and openness in data sharing. The reporting of negative data is crucially important.

## **5. Communication, education and public awareness**

### **Conclusions**

There remains keen interest by the media in the spread of H5N1 HPAI and its impacts. Unfortunately, much reporting remains inaccurate. This can create political pressure for ill-advised and disproportionate policies such as the culling of wild birds and/or the destruction of their nests and wetland habitats. Conversely, an informed public can more readily assess levels of relative risk.

Communication of clear scientific messages is the key to better public understanding. Explaining issues of relative risk to the public is particularly important and the use of simple comparisons can help (e.g. compared to risk of a plane crashing, or a person being struck by lightning, etc.).

The meeting identified the following good practice on the basis of practical experience:

- Conservation organisations, scientists and veterinary services all need to work actively with the media to enhance the accuracy of reporting on this issue. This should include the development of much more effective communication strategies to give policy makers,

stakeholders, and the general public more balanced information on real levels of risk and appropriate responses.

- The [AIWEb site](#) now provides a range of resources for media, and journalists should be encouraged to use this information, including the Task Force's booklet *Avian Influenza and Wild Birds*. The website and booklet should be further developed and updated.
- Do not be tempted to avoid awkward facts even if others do.
- Web-based organisational position statements should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they accurately present the current situation.
- Organisations should identify specific, informed members of staff who are responsible for media briefings and who work to a contingency and communications plan. That plan should think through, and prepare responses to potentially difficult questions.
- The provision of quotes for e-News Groups (Science Media Service) is a useful means of disseminating organisational positions.

There are several readily available guides for relating to the media, including the extensive guidance published by [IUCN's Species Survival Commission](#) which, *inter alia*, stresses **the five Fs of media relations**:

**1. Fast**

Respect journalists' deadlines. Return calls as pledged. An unreturned call is an incalculable 'faux pas'.

**2. Factual**

Be factual. But make the facts interesting. Journalists appreciate facts stated with some literary flourish.

**3. Frank**

Be candid. Never mislead journalists. Be as open as possible and respond to their questions.

**4. Fair**

Be fair to journalists if you expect them to be fair to you. Favouring one news outlet consistently will lose you the confidence of others.

**5. Friendly**

Like everyone else, journalists appreciate courtesy. Remember their names. Read what they write. Know their interests. Thank them when they cover your issues.

**Maps and graphical representations**

'A picture paints a thousand words'. Maps and graphical representations are powerful means of communication, although they also can distort reality. Particular issues which have the potential to misrepresent include:

- the inaccurate mapping of locations of infection (sometimes represented as the capital cities of the countries in which infection occurs);
- the shading of whole territories to depict the presence of infection, in situations where infection is actually restricted to perhaps one or two specific locations in one part of a territory; and
- that maps can dangerously simplify issues since they typically only show where infection is known, and not where it may be present yet unknown.

There would be benefits in the development of simple, but accurate illustrations that communicate AI-related information more accurately. These should include information on the movements and international trade in poultry and poultry products as well as of wild birds.

**Key recommendations for future action**

1. Those involved with avian influenza should proactively work with the media to enhance the accuracy of their reporting of science, thus improving public understanding. This should

particularly involve the communication of positive messages as well as responses to negative ones. To this end, targeted briefings of journalists are helpful. The development of much more effective communication strategies is necessary to give policy makers, stakeholders and the general public more balanced information on the real levels of risk and appropriate responses.

2. Organisations should identify specific, informed members of their staff who are responsible for media briefings and who work on a contingency and communications planning. They should expect the unexpected and prepare for it. They should stick to areas of expertise and avoid comment about other issues. Briefing of media should always be evidence-based and avoid speculation in the absence of evidence. The accuracy of facts supplied by others should be repeatedly checked before passing these to the media. Much useful information is available on the Task Force web-site ([www.aiweb.info](http://www.aiweb.info)).
3. Task Force members should use the booklet *Avian Influenza and Wild Birds* for media briefings and promote its use by others. It should be reviewed and updated as necessary. English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic versions are now available. However, the Task Force should also develop a media 'tool kit' that brings together national and organisational media best practice and Frequently Asked Questions. This should include factual information that may be adapted for specific national needs and uses.
4. At present much guidance related to H5N1 HPAI is published in a limited range of languages. It is important to translate guidance into a wider range of other, and more local, languages so as to facilitate its dissemination.
5. The Task Force should stimulate the publication of simple bird identification guides in local languages so as to assist field-based staff responses to cases of infection. A web-based list or directory of experts that could assist (at a distance) in identification of bird species based on photographs would also be highly desirable.
6. The degradation of the health of ecosystems as documented by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and especially in the decline in extent and condition of wetlands is considered to have had a rôle in the evolution and spread of H5N1HPAI. This environmental change has created the conditions where there is closer contact and mixing between people, livestock (including poultry and domestic ducks), and wild waterbirds, potentially resulting in cross-infections. Reducing the opportunities for such contacts through preventing further loss of wetlands, improving mechanisms for the maintenance and wise use of wetlands is an important long-term requirement. To this end it would be valuable to develop and disseminate practical guidance, *inter alia* in collaboration with the Ramsar Convention.

## **6. Research and data needs**

### **Conclusions**

- There remains an important need to make data and information more readily available for decision makers and others who lack a technical understanding of ornithological information. Integrated syntheses of ringing and waterbird count data in the form of flyway atlases are important means by which this can be undertaken. Availability of information on birds at the level of the individual site is also important in responding to outbreaks and should always be included in response planning.
- Collaboration with existing waterbird research programmes would provide a cost-effective means of taking forward the implementation of satellite telemetric and other studies that aim to better understand waterbird migration and movements.
- Understanding better the behaviour and ecology of 'bridge' species that live in close proximity to man and poultry remains a priority area of research. This research is directly relevant to risk assessments and developing practical guidance for enhancing biosecurity.

- There remains a need to develop better understanding of levels of normal mortality levels in waterbirds.

### **Key recommendations for future action**

1. There remains a need to develop a better understanding of the behaviour and ecology of 'bridge' species, as well as other means of the local or short distance spread of HPAI infection, such that this information might be used to develop enhanced guidance on biosecurity and contribute to risk analysis
2. It would be valuable to have a better understanding of the duration of viral shedding by bird species likely to be held in captivity. This would inform possible response strategies for zoos and collections in the event of infection outbreaks.
3. Better monitoring and surveillance for avian influenza within markets that trade in wildlife, is highly desirable. This should include research into which species are traded, their origins and movements.
4. There remains a need for better information on relevant cultural and religious practices, such as the widespread purchase and release into the wild of birds at certain times of the year (*e.g.* merit releases), and how those practices might be safeguarded but at the same time, minimize the risk of disease spread to humans, wild birds, and poultry.
5. H5N1 HPAI has affected several non-avian species, although knowledge of its ecology in these taxa is particular poor. Those species that have been infected are thought to be accidental, dead-end hosts, and there is no current evidence for them being involved in the maintenance of infection in any area. However, there is a need to continue to assess this issue during epidemiological investigations as it is possible that in the future a mammalian species may become a maintenance host and thus spread H5N1 HPAI locally.
6. Knowledge of the degree to which H5N1 HPAI may be passed between different bird species (and whether this happens asymptotically or not) is important information that could help refine risk assessments. Research which leads to the development of serological tests for avian influenza antibodies in different species of birds will ultimately provide the most useful epidemiological information. Serological testing in past LPAI outbreaks has given important insights. Basic research on the immunological responses to H5N1 HPAI infection by birds (possibly using a representative avian model in one species) is important. A current priority is to develop validated serological diagnostic tests for the full range of bird species potentially at risk.
7. There remains a need to continue to gather, collate and co-ordinate data and information on wild bird distributions, their movements, stop-over sites and flyways. Satellite telemetry is a particularly valuable tool for this work. It is also important to continue to gather data at site level, since such local information is very limited in many parts of the world.
8. For many, access to the most recent scientific literature is constrained by inability to subscribe to expensive on-line journals, thus hindering understanding. The Task Force should help tackle this issue, possibly by working with authors to make the most relevant scientific literature available on [AIWeB](#) and web-based resources, or by investigating the potential for corporate sponsorship.

## **6. Finances**

### **Key recommendations for future action**

1. Recent events with respect to avian influenza have focussed attention on the need for resources to develop national veterinary capacity and programmes of surveillance and monitoring for wildlife diseases, especially zoonoses, but also to develop background information on wild birds, and especially their movements. A good start has been made, but

there remains the need for further investments, particular to allow the development of the wildlife disease sector.

2. The Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza has provided a valuable co-ordination function between its many collaborating organisations. Financial resources are required to facilitate its continued operation.



## Annex 1

### Guidance and key sources of information

#### Contingency planning and risk assessment

##### General

- [Opinion of European Food Safety Authorities' \(EFSA\) Panel on Animal Health and Welfare and their \*Scientific report on migratory birds and their possible role in the spread of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza\*](#). Risk assessment for the EU regarding the potential for the arrival and spread of H5N1 in the EU by European Food Safety Authority (2006).
- [EFSA Opinion adopted by the AHAW Panel related to \*Animal health and welfare risks associated with the import of wild birds other than poultry into the European Union\*](#) European Food Safety Authority (2006).
- [National web-sites of EU Member States dealing with H5N1](#)
- [Manual on the preparation of national animal disease emergency preparedness plans](#). FAO (1999).
- [National contingency and avian/human pandemic influenza preparedness plans](#). Web-links to 35 national plans compiled by FAO.
- [Wildlife trade and global disease emergence](#). (Karesh, W.B. *et al.* 2005).

##### Poultry holdings

- [Preparing for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: a manual for countries at risk](#). FAO & OIE (2006).
- [Avian Influenza Incursion Analysis \(through wild birds\)](#). British Trust for Ornithology Research Report No. 448. (2006) (12.2 MB file)

##### Nature reserves and wild birds

- [Urgent preliminary assessment of ornithological data relevant to the spread of Avian Influenza in Europe](#). Wetlands International, (2006).
- [Methodology for rapid assessment of ornithological sites](#) Wetlands International (2006). See also example [assessments of example European wetlands](#).
- [Guidelines for Reducing Avian Influenza Risks at Wetland Protected Areas of International Importance for Migratory Waterbirds](#). R.C. Prentice (in prep). Available from the web-site of the [UNEP/GEF Siberian Crane Wetlands Project](#) from September 2007.
- [Ramsar Convention Resolution IX.23 on Highly pathogenic avian influenza and its consequences for wetland and waterbird conservation and wise use](#) (November 2005).
- [The Ramsar Wetland Risk Assessment Framework](#). (Adopted by Ramsar Resolution VII.10; 1999).
- The Ramsar "Toolkit" 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition ([Ramsar Handbooks for the Wise Use of Wetlands](#)).

##### Zoos and collections

- [Advice from the British and Irish Association of Zoos and Aquariums on avian influenza](#).
- [BIAZA guidelines on vaccinating birds against Avian Influenza](#). British and Irish Association of Zoos and Aquariums (September 2006).

- [Risk assessment: avian influenza in public parks/parkland & open waters due to wild bird exposure](#). (UK Health Protection Agency/Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2006).

## Responding to avian influenza infection

- Prevention and Control of Avian Flu in Small-scale Poultry: A guide for veterinary paraprofessionals. [A guide for veterinary paraprofessionals in Vietnam](#) and [A guide for veterinary paraprofessionals in Cambodia](#). FAO [Also available in [French](#), [Indonesian](#), [Kyrgyz](#), [Laoatian](#), [Russian](#), [Spanish](#) and [Vietnamese](#)].
- [Summary record of the Joint meeting of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health and of the Ornis Committee, Brussels, 1 December 2006](#). (Includes a review of HPAI outbreaks in the EU 2005-2006).
- [Interim Guidance for Protection of Persons Involved in U.S. Avian Influenza Outbreak Disease Control and Eradication Activities](#). US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2006).
- [Avian Influenza: Protecting Poultry Workers at Risk. US Safety and Health Information Bulletin](#). U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (2004).

## Surveillance and early warning systems

- [EU Guidelines for AI surveillance in wild birds and poultry in 2007](#). European Commission, DG SANCO (2007).
- [Guidelines on the implementation of survey programmes for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds to be carried out in the Member States in 2007](#). European Commission, DG SANCO (2006).
- [Guiding Principles for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Surveillance and Diagnostic Networks in Asia](#). FAO (2004).
- [Wild Bird HPAI Surveillance: sample collection from healthy, sick and dead birds](#). FAO (2006).
- [Wild birds and Avian Influenza in Africa: summary of surveillance and monitoring programmes](#). Wetlands International, CIRAD & FAO.
- [Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance \(GAINS\)](#)
- [Results of EU avian influenza surveillance](#). European Commission, DG SANCO.
- [EU Animal Disease Notification System](#). European Commission, DG SANCO.
- Emergency assistance for early detection and prevention of Avian Influenza; Terms of Reference for Participants in Field Sampling Missions. Wetlands International internal guidance (2006).

## Health and safety guidance

- [Diseases from birds, with particular reference to Avian Influenza](#). UK guidance to bird ringers; British Trust for Ornithology (March 2006).
- [Working with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus](#). UK Health and Safety Executive guidance.
- [Risk assessment: avian influenza in public parks/parkland & open waters due to wild bird exposure](#). UK Health Protection Agency/Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (2006).

## Epidemiology: tracing sources of infection

- [Epidemiology of H5N1 Avian Influenza in Asia and implications for regional control](#). (2005).
- [Outbreaks of H5N1 HPAI virus in Europe during 2005/2006: an overview and commentary](#). UK Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (2006). [3.4 MB]
- [Guidelines on the implementation of survey programmes for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds to be carried out in the Member States in 2007](#). European Commission, DG SANCO (2006).
- [Summary epidemiological report on a H5N1 HPAI case in turkeys in England, January 2007](#) which illustrates the modus operandi of the UK Ornithological Expert Panel in a structured epidemiological investigation. UK Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (2007).

## Communication, education and public awareness

- [IUCN Species Survival Commission Media Guide](#)
- [Science and Development Network: Dealing with the media](#)
- [Green Guide to effective PR](#)
- [Civicus Toolkit on handling the media](#)
- [AIWEb](#) media pages

## Annex 2

### Progress since the 2006 Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza seminar in Nairobi

#### Contingency planning and risk assessment

- Many national risk assessments and contingency plans have now been developed. However, full implementation of these remains an issue in some countries, and further, [many such assessments](#) relate more to human pandemic influenza contingency planning than to other aspects of avian influenza assessments in poultry or wildlife populations. There remains a need to better collate such risk assessments, through either a clearing house mechanism or an active collaboration between agencies or institutions.
- Wetlands International and EURING have produced, with funding from the European Commission, a [synthesis of data and information](#) related to waterbird distribution, numbers and movements in Europe and analyses to predict migratory patterns is being produced at the moment. This has helped to develop risk assessments for the EU, including those related to species and locations. There remains a pressing need for similar assessments to be undertaken for Neotropical, African and Asian flyways for which such assessments remain lacking.
- There has been growing awareness of eco-health issues and the unsustainable nature of intensive poultry production processes.

#### Surveillance and early warning systems

- There has been generally good development of more strategic programmes of surveillance in wild bird populations partly based on risk assessments within the European Union, although progress elsewhere has been more limited. The recommended establishment of long-term AIV surveillance programmes in strategically important mixing/staging areas used by migratory birds has still to be developed.
- The funding of the NEWFLUBIRD programme by the European Commission has been a significant development. This provides a multidisciplinary network for early warning system for influenza viruses in migratory birds in Europe. The network includes ornithological studies and sampling, virus detection, isolation and characterisation and data processing for early warning and risk evaluation, and it brings together a multi-disciplinary consortium involving virologists, epidemiologists, modellers and ornithologists, liaising with relevant international organisations and policy makers. It is a potential model for other geographical regions.
- The development of the Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance (GAINS) has valuably started to provide wider international perspectives on the extent and location of current surveillance for avian influenza viruses.
- There remains a need to develop regional 'hubs' for AI reporting (such as for example is provided by the EU and COMESA). Regional overview of reporting continues to be desirable in other parts of the world, for example in East, South-East and Central Asia, and the Neotropics.
- The Global Early Warning System (GLEWS) for transboundary animal diseases, including zoonoses— a joint initiative of FAO, OIE and WHO — has been developed. As highlighted in Nairobi, it remains desirable to augment GLEWS such that it has the capability to better track and report on H5N1 HPAI in populations of wild birds.

**Annex**  
(English only)

**Final**

- The development of capacity to undertake national programmes of surveillance for avian influenza remains a major issue. Significant progress has been made in the framework of the FAO Technical Co-operation Programmes (Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe) including the implementation of surveillance programmes by CIRAD and Wetlands International in Africa which have had a training element.
- [Programmes of satellite telemetry](#) of migratory waterbirds in Africa, Mongolia and China by FAO, the US Geological Service, CIRAD and Wetlands International have combined to make a better understanding of migration patterns.

### **Communication, education and public awareness**

- The development of the [AIWEb site](#) has been a major development in providing a access to a wide range of information about avian influenza targeted as a number of separate audiences.
- A leaflet on avian influenza and wild birds has been developed by the Task Force and published in Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic versions.

## Annex 3

### Recommended ornithological information to be collected during surveillance programmes or the field assessment of mortality events in wild birds<sup>7</sup>

#### A. Useful information to be collected:

1. All birds from which samples are taken should be identified to species. Where clearly distinguishable sub-species or discrete populations exist as for some geese, this information should also be collected and reported<sup>8</sup>. Age<sup>9</sup> and sex should be recorded wherever possible.
2. Close collaboration with ornithologists in the capture and sampling of live birds not only facilitates identification of birds but also gives the opportunity to collect additional information on the sampled live birds (such as weight, age, sex and condition), important to developing better understanding of viral ecology and epidemiology. Standard protocols exist for the collection of such data through national ringing schemes (details of which are available via EURING<sup>10</sup>). Recording individual ring numbers<sup>11</sup> in the reporting spreadsheet provides a means of accessing these data for future analysis.
3. To provide an audit of identification, it is highly desirable that a clear digital photograph<sup>12</sup> is taken of each sampled bird (especially those found dead and/or not identified by ornithologists) and stored at least until confirmation of laboratory tests. In the event of positive results further examination of such photos can provide additional information on the age and sex of the bird, in addition to proving the identity of the species beyond doubt and thus allowing the case to be correctly put into context. To facilitate this, each individual bird should be given a code that is used on the cloacal and oro-pharyngeal swabs taken, and this code should be on a piece of card that is visible in each photograph taken.
4. Especially related to sampling in the vicinity of outbreaks, it is desirable to collect a range of contextual information so as to better understand the viral epidemiology of H5N1 HPAI in wild bird populations. Such information should include:
  - a. clear locational and descriptive data about the catching site, ideally GPS co-ordinates, and including habitat description (*e.g.* lake, river, village pond, fish farm, *etc.*) and distance to human settlement, agricultural land, and poultry farms;
  - b. record of the numbers of each species of other live birds in the sampling area that were not sampled;
  - c. if available, records of bird movements (arrivals/departures) which occurred at the sampling site prior to the sampling;
  - d. assessment of the numbers of each species of live bird in the sampling area that were not sampled but that were showing signs of ill health; and

<sup>7</sup> Based on [Guidelines on the implementation of survey programmes for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds to be carried out in the Member States in 2007](#). European Commission, DG SANCO, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Wetlands International's publication *Waterbird Population Estimates [Wetlands International 2006. Waterbird Population Estimates - Fourth Edition. Wetlands International, Wageningen, The Netherlands. 239 pp.]* should be used as a source of information on the taxonomy and populations of waterbirds.

<sup>9</sup> Waterbirds are aged mainly by the size and shape of their wing feathers (mainly on greater covert and tertial shape - [www.bto.org/ringing/ringinfo/resources/topography.pdf](http://www.bto.org/ringing/ringinfo/resources/topography.pdf)) and their tail feathers (juveniles having notched tail feathers).

<sup>10</sup> [www.EURING.org](http://www.EURING.org)

<sup>11</sup> Records of previously ringed or colour-ringed birds provide especially valuable information and should always be reported to national ringing offices or to EURING - [www.ring.ac](http://www.ring.ac). Colour-rings on birds should always be photographed *in situ*.

<sup>12</sup> In order to facilitate identification of bird species (which can sometime vary in quite minor plumage details, especially at certain times of the year), photographs should be taken according to the guidance given in part B of this Annex.

- e. given that birds of some species (such as Mallards *Anas platyrhynchos*) can occur either as free-living birds which are able to move between sites, or occur in a feral state, habituated to foods provided by man, distinguishing between these categories would be useful. Sometimes the presence of unusual plumage patterns - indicating domestication - is useful in this respect.

### **B. Guidance on taking photographs of dead birds for identification purposes**

The following simple guidance will assist non-specialists in taking photographs, especially of dead birds, that will allow subsequent identification to species. Different bird species are identified by differing characteristics, so it is difficult to provide universal guidance applicable in all situations. However, the following is a minimum standard that should be followed.

All wild birds collected for analysis for HPAI should have digital photographs<sup>13</sup> taken as soon as possible after collection. The bird should fully fill the photograph and wherever possible include a ruler or other scale measure.

Photographs should be taken of:

- the whole bird, dorsal side, with one wing stretched out and tail spread and visible;
- the head in profile clearly showing the beak;
- close-up photos of the tips of wing feathers can often determine whether the bird is an adult or a juvenile (bird in its first year);
- ideally photographs of both dorsal and ventral views of the bird should be taken<sup>14</sup>; and
- any ventral photographs should show the legs and feet (since leg colour is often an important species diagnostic). If any rings (metal or plastic) are present on the legs, these should be photographed *in situ* as well as recording ring details.
- Any conspicuous markings/patterns should be photographed.

At certain times of the year, such as late summer (July - late August in the northern hemisphere) many waterbirds, and especially ducks and geese, undergo moult and can be especially difficult to identify by non-specialists. At such times clear photographs are especially important to aid identification of (duck) carcasses. The patch of colour on the open wing (called the “speculum”) is often especially useful. The identification of young gulls at any time of the year is also difficult and typically they will also need to be photographed and identified by specialists.

Photographs should be retained, linked to an individual specimen, at least until laboratory tests are returned as negative for avian influenza.

Photographs can be used immediately if identification of the species of bird is in any doubt, and for subsequent checking of the identification if necessary.

A unique code or reference number, which is the same as the code or reference number of any samples taken from the birds should be visible in each photograph so as to link samples and photographs.

---

<sup>13</sup> Each photograph should be taken at the highest resolution possible and if the camera has a ‘date stamp’ feature then this should be enabled so that the image is saved with a time reference – this may help verify the sequence of images taken at a site on a day. Images should be downloaded to a computer as soon as possible and information about location and date added to the file properties.

<sup>14</sup> Photographs of the upper and under surfaces of the wing and spread tail will facilitate aging and sexing of birds (e.g. Northern Pintail *Anas acuta*).

## Glossary

AEWA	Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds
AI	Avian influenza
AIV	Avian influenza virus
CIRAD	Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (France)
CMS	Convention on the conservation of Migratory Species
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
GAINS	Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance
GLEWS	Global Early Warning System for transboundary animal diseases, including zoonoses (FAO, OIE, WHO)
GPS	Global Positioning System
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
LPAI	Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza
NEWFLUBIRD	Network for Early Warning of Influenza Viruses in Migratory Birds in Europe
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
WWT	The Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust, UK